This article reexamines the administered contracts approach to regulation in light of recent empirical research that establishes the importance of transaction-costs in the organizational choice and design decisions. After reviewing the fundamentals of transaction cost reasoning and the franchise bidding-versus-regulation debate, the study surveys the empirical literature on franchise bidding, contracting, and vertical integration. The implications of transaction-cost theories for current policies toward pubic utility regulation and deregulation are also addressed.
Introduction
Although transaction-cost economics has had its greatest influence on the analysis of vertical integration and contracting, many of the central arguments and concepts identified with modern transaction-cost theory trace their origins to the regulatory debates of the 1960s and 1970s. Spurred by Harold Demsetz ' (1968) franchise-bidding solution to the natural monopoly problem, Oliver Williamson (1975) and Victor Goldberg (1976) set out the first detailed, comparative analyses of the roles and limitations of markets and regulation as alternative institutions for the governance of public utility transactions. The problems communities encountered in the procurement of public utility services were, as it turned out, isomorphic to the problems private firms faced in deciding whether to make or buy intermediate goods and in designing and administering contractual relations. Because of its relative tractability, transaction-cost theory concentrated on vertical integration and contractWe would like to thank Michael Crew, Victor Goldberg, Mark Lowry, Claude Menard, and Roger Sherman for helpful comments.
ing issues in nonregulatory settings in its subsequent development. (See, especially, Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1975; 1985) .) But that development was and continues to be informed by arguments and insights generated in the debate over franchise bidding versus regulation.
A variety of factors combine to make this an appropriate time for an appraisal of developments in transaction-cost economics in the ensuing years and their implications for public utility regulation. First, considerable progress has been made in both the content and evaluation of transaction-cost theories of organization. In particular, a substantial body of empirical evidence now underlies the theory of governance choice and design. Second, a number of major changes have occurred in technology and the regulatory environment of public utilities. Whereas public utilities have traditionally exhibited a high degree of vertical integration, with production, transmission, and distribution often organized within a single firm, recent public policies have fostered increasing vertical disintegration in the utilities sector. The well-documented separation of local access and long-distance service occasioned by the AT&T breakup is probably the most prominent example, but similar trends have occurred in electricity, where generation is increasingly becoming the domain of independent firms (Joskow 1991a), and in natural gas, where sales and transportation have been largely unbundled (Teece 1990; DeCanio and Frech 1993; Lyon and Hackett 1993) . More arms-length exchanges are thus replacing vertical integration in a number of regulated environments. Yet, the alternative is rarely the competitive spot market seemingly envisioned by regulators. Instead, long-term contracts appear to be the preferred norm.
These changes in the institutional and regulatory structure of the public utility sector have resulted in a number of important policy questions. The first concerns the efficiency consequences of the movement away from a vertically integrated institutional structure. To the extent that the government has imposed vertical disintegration through the courts (AT&T), regulatory agencies (FERC), or legislation (PURPA 1978) , what are the likely efficiency effects? The second relates to the design of the most efficient regulatory framework in a vertically disintegrated environment. How, for example, does the procurement of inputs through long-term contracts influence the appropriate design of regulations? The recent empirical work on transaction costs and optimal institutional choice provides guidance on both counts. Finally, the transaction cost, or administered contracts, view of regulation represents an alternative to the mechanism design perspective that dominates much of the current theoretical literature on regulation. This paper represents an opportunity to interpret and assess that literature through a t~ansaction-cost lens.
The structure of the paper is summarized in table 1. Our discussion begins with a general overview of transaction cost reasoning and theory, followed by a recapitulation of the franchise bidding-administered contracts debate. The third section contains a summary of the empirical research on public utility regulation that addresses the issues and hypotheses developed within the administered contracting framework, followed by a broader review of the empirical transaction-cost literature. Section four develops some of the implications of this literature for regulatory policy, and a final section contains concluding remarks.
Transaction Costs, Institutional Choice, and Administered Contracts

Fundamentals of Transaction-Cost Reasoning
The logical foundation for analyzing organization and governance issues in transaction-cost terms is Coase's (1960) insight that all potential gains from trade would be realized but for
